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The last decade has witnessed a renaissance of empirical and psychological approaches
to art study, especially regarding cognitive models of art processing experience. This new
emphasis on modeling has often become the basis for our theoretical understanding
of human interaction with art. Models also often define areas of focus and hypotheses
for new empirical research, and are increasingly important for connecting psychological
theory to discussions of the brain. However, models are often made by different
researchers, with quite different emphases or visual styles. Inputs and psychological
outcomes may be differently considered, or can be under-reported with regards to key
functional components. Thus, we may lose the major theoretical improvements and
ability for comparison that can be had with models. To begin addressing this, this paper
presents a theoretical assessment, comparison, and new articulation of a selection of
key contemporary cognitive or information-processing-based approaches detailing the
mechanisms underlying the viewing of art. We review six major models in contemporary
psychological aesthetics. We in turn present redesigns of these models using a unified
visual form, in some cases making additions or creating new models where none had
previously existed. We also frame these approaches in respect to their targeted outputs
(e.g., emotion, appraisal, physiological reaction) and their strengths within a more general
framework of early, intermediate, and later processing stages. This is used as a basis for
general comparison and discussion of implications and future directions for modeling,
and for theoretically understanding our engagement with visual art.
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INTRODUCTION
Today, millions of individuals across the globe regularly encounter works of art. Whether, in the
museum, the city-center, or on the web, art is an omnipresent part of human life. Underlying the
fascination with art is a uniquely impactful experience. When individuals describe noteworthy art
or explain why they go to museums, most often they refer to a complex mix of psychological
events (Pelowski and Akiba, 2011). Art viewing engenders myriad emotions, evokes evaluations,
physiological reactions, and in some cases can mark or alter lives. Reactions can also differ greatly
between individuals and settings, or evolve within individual experiences themselves.
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Understanding this multifaceted impact of art is key
for numerous areas of scholarship—including all humanities,
sociology, evolution, museum education, art history—and is
especially key for psychology and empirical art research (Leder,
2013). The relevance of the topic has only grown in the past
decade, which has seen a burgeoning of psychological aesthetics
through the emergence of new empirical methods, growing
interest in affect and emotion, and new integration between
behavioral and neurophysiological analyses.
Perhaps most important, recent approaches have been
accompanied by attempts to model the underlying processes
of art engagement (Leder, 2013). These models build from
recent trends in cognitive science, employing a visual approach
for highlighting the interconnections and outcomes in our
experience. They posit key inputs, and connect these via a flow
of processing stages (often utilizing a box-and-arrow design)
to outcomes or psychological implications. Thus, by offering
a process-driven articulation of psychological elements, models
have become the indispensable basis for shaping hypotheses.
Even more, by stepping beyond written theory and articulating
ideas within a visual frame, models can emphasize processes
and important elements that previously might have been merely
implicit. Thus, the visual models themselves often become the
working theories for art study, and determine empirical research.
However, current modeling also suffers from several
limitations, which hamper our ability to fully compare and
understand approaches. Models are often made with different
emphases and visual grammars. There are often also different
arrangements of processing stages or focus on different portions
of the processing sequence. Psychological inputs and outcomes
are also often differently considered, or can be omitted from the
processing sequence. Thus, we often lose the major theoretical
benefit—a clear connection between inputs, processes, and
outputs—that can be had from placing ideas into a visual
form. It is also difficult to consider various models’ overlaps
or major differences when explaining specific reactions to art,
and thus difficult to articulate how they might contribute to our
understanding of art experience.
This is the goal of this paper, which represents our attempt
to provide a comparison of current key modeling approaches,
and involving their translation into a comparable visual format.
We do this by reviewing six influential approaches to art
experience, as well as supporting literature by the same authors,
and place these into a model form. For existing models, we
adapt the previous approaches to a unified layout, and also
suggest additions or changes based on our literature review.
When an author’s idea does not yet have a visual form, we newly
create models based on their arguments. Through our review,
we also give specific consideration to outputs or psychological
implications for art experience, as well as general organization
around early, intermediate and late processing stages. We end
with a synthesis and discussion of avenues for future research.
In this review, we have chosen approaches, which, we feel, have
come to be bases for the past decade of general empirical art-
viewing research, and which employ a cognitive or information
processing focus. Although this paper can, admittedly, only
address a small selection of models, by providing this analysis, we
hope to create one more useful tool for advancing understanding
of art processing and modeling research.
REVIEW: KEY MODEL COMPONENTS AND
PREVIOUS APPROACHES TO MODELING
ART
Before beginning, it is instructive to briefly review what aspects
should be considered in models of viewing art, and which will
provide the material for this paper’s comparison. Psychological
models generally have threemain components. These include: (1)
inputs that feed into experience. These might include personality
of the viewer, social or cultural setting, background affective state,
other context (e.g., Jacobsen, 2006), as well as the specific artwork
body and its history (Bullot and Reber, 2013); (2) processing
mechanisms, which act on the inputs in specific stages (explained
further below); and (3) mental and behavioral consequences
(outputs) that arise from processing art. While it is the second
stage of actual processing that makes up the bulk of models we
will review, it is these outputs that constitute their implicit goal
of addressing art interaction, and also the frame for this paper’s
review.
A literature review suggests multiple output examples. We
have given these short labels, which will be used in the
following discussions, and which can be divided into four main
clusters: First, art has the capability to influence basic aspects
of affect or the body. This can come from: (1) Affect, specific
emotions/moods evoked by content or derived from the act of
viewing; (2) Physiology, such as heart rate, skin conductivity, or
other processes of the autonomic nervous system (e.g., Tschacher
et al., 2012); and (3) Actions, for example gesture, eye movement,
or physical movement during art reception.
Art also has been connected to numerous aspects of
perception and understanding (e.g., see Leder et al., 2004),
including: (4) Appraisals or particular judgments (beauty, liking);
(5)Meaning-making as well as ability to strengthen conceptions,
help us to learn, challenge our ideas, or even lead to insight. (6)
Novelty: Art can impact what we see, induce changes in visual
or perceptual experience involving new attention to physical
aspects.
There are also elements which are more art-specific, or
which are particularly salient in reports of art experience:
(7) Transcendence: feelings of more sudden change, epiphany,
or catharsis (Pelowski and Akiba, 2011); (8) Aesthetic mode:
“aesthetic” emotions and responses, which might involve a
state of being, whereby one detaches or uncouples from
concerns or everyday life perceptions, often related to periods
of contemplation or harmonious enjoyment, as well as potential
positive reaction to negatively-valenced or troubling art (Cupchik
et al., 2009). (9) Negative affect: Art can also evoke negative
reactions such as disgust, queasiness or anger—outcomes that
particularly require an explanation in models of experience
(Silvia, 2009).
Art is also argued to create longitudinal impacts. These
include: (10) Self-adjustment, changes in one’s personality,
worldview, cognitive ability (Lasher et al., 1983), or in the relation
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between art and viewer. This might also include a deepened
ability to appreciate art or a more general improvement in visual-
spatial ability (Funch et al., 2012). (11) Social: Art also may guide
social behavior—e.g., in rituals or institutions—or lead to social
ends such as indoctrination or social cohesion (Dissayanake,
2008). (12) Health: art may even have general impact on health
andwellbeing, for example through reduced stress (Cuypers et al.,
2012).
A Brief Note on Previous Art Modeling
Research
The above aspects have been the main focus for attempts to
explain interaction with art. Models—as a result of systematic,
scientific endeavor—can be traced back to at least the work
of Berlyne (e.g., Berlyne, 1960, 1974; see also Funch, 2013 for
review), who revived focus on art within empirical aesthetics,
integrating a psychophysiological and cognitive perspective.
Looking to physiological arousal, he posited opposing reward
and aversion systems tied to “collative” art properties. He was
followed by Kreitler and Kreitler (1972), who took a largely
cognitive and Gestalt approach, arguing that artwork content
and structure make it a carrier of multiple meanings that can
stimulate understanding and emotion. Similarly, based onGestalt
perception, (e.g., Arnheim, 1966) considered the means whereby
structural unity of artworks (balance, grouping) and individual
features drive responses. This was followed by, for example,
Martindale (Martindale, 1988; Martindale et al., 1988), who more
fully emphasized cognition, focusing on matching of schema and
stimulus, and proposing prototypicality as a key determinant for
positive appraisal/affective response. These were followed by an
even greater expansion of approaches. Notable examples include:
Lasher et al. (1983), who proposed a cognition-based model
of profound experience or insight; Ramachandran and Hirstein
(1999), who gave one of the first attempts to posit universal
rules for reactions and their underlying biological or neurological
connections; and Jacobsen (2006) as well as Solso (1994), Vitz
(1988), Zeki and Nash (1999), who presented an integrative
neuro-cognitive theory. Other important approaches, many of
which deal with specific aspects of viewing, also include: the
fluency-based theory of aesthetic pleasure by Reber et al. (2004);
Graf and Landwehr’s (2015) updated consideration of fluency
and visual interest; Van de Cruys and Wagemans (2011) account
of rewarding reactions; Armstrong and Detweiler-Bedell’s (2008)
work with beauty; Funch’s (2007) phenomenological model
of art experience; Carbon (2011); Hekkert’s (2012) design-
based model; Bullot and Reber’s (2013) integrated model of
low-level processes and top-down integration regarding viewer
knowledge of artwork history; and Tinio’s (2013) consideration
of creating/viewing art.
These approaches, among many others, give a basis for
present modeling, notably pointing out the importance of
individual elements such as beauty, pleasure. They also represent
a research trend from emphasizing single, often simple visual
elements to a more complex interplay of factors, which
may drive emotion and physiological response. Especially
cognitive approaches have also strongly contributed to the
basic input-process-output form of the models we consider
below.
CURRENT MODELS AND COHESIVE
THEORIES OF INTERACTING WITH ART
What follows is a review of six models, which we feel, offer
a good overview of present approaches to general empirical
exploration of art experience. These again are not the only
important models, as witnessed from the review above, but were
chosen because they offer psychological explanations which are
explicit in respect to underlying cognitive processes, and which
are presently used in empirical consideration of outputs/inputs
when viewing art. The following paragraphs will follow a repeated
pattern: First, the background and main elements of each model
are presented and put into a unified visual form. When a
visual example has been previously produced by the models’
authors, we have attempted to reproduce in verbatim the original
structure and wording, with only some shifting in the location
of elements. At the same time, we have taken the liberty of
creating new models or new processing elements when this was
deemed to be necessary. To distinguish from our own additions,
previously created model components are shown in black, while
our contributions are shown in blue. All models will thus have
a standardized format, employing five components. Inputs and
contextual factors are shown with rounded edges and depicted
on the far left, processing stages in the middle, and outputs on
the far right (distinguished by a gray band).
The middle section also incorporates a timeline (bottom),
showing general ordering and designating early, intermediate,
and late processing stages. These were included because
the specific placement of components within these stages
may be key in hypothesis-making, and the relative emphasis
also varies greatly between the reviewed models. Although
there is as of yet no agreed-upon distinction, generally the
early stage refers to immediate, automatic, bottom-up visual
processing and attention, while intermediate refers to more
specific processes involving object recognition, classification
and memory contribution. The late stage refers to more overt
cognitive components such as reflection, association, or changes
in viewer approach (Leder and Nadal, 2014). Thus, this factor
provided one more point for comparison and for the ordering
of model presentation below. In the time line, we also include
designation of automatic or more overtly conscious processing,
as this is mentioned in many approaches. Finally, specific
outputs, using the above labels (see also Table 2), are placed in
red circles at their suggested model location. If an output could
be posited, yet was not explicitly considered by the authors, it is
shown in a lighter shade.
Chatterjee: Neurological/Cognitive Model
We begin with the earliest model from the present group,
and one which emphasizes early processing stages. This also
makes a nice example of the present box and arrow design.
This model was introduced by Chatterjee, 2004, 2009, 2010;
see Cela-Conde et al., 2011 for review), and has become a
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central tool for framing empirical assessments. It was designed
to address cognitive and neuropsychological aspects, connecting
processing stages to brain functioning. Chatterjee (2010) argues
that visual interaction with art has multiple components and that
experience emerges from a combination of responses to these
elements. It draws its main theoretical emphasis from vision
research (Chatterjee, 2004, 2010). Thus, it focuses primarily
on three stages which are argued to correspond to the rough
functional division of “early,” “intermediate,” and “late” human
visual recognition (e.g., Marr, 1982).
As shown in Figure 1, where we have reproduced the
original model, Chatterjee posits that visual attributes of art are
first processed, like any other stimulus, by extracting simple
components (location, color, shape, luminance, motion) from
the visual environment, and processing these in different brain
regions1. Early features are subsequently either segregated or,
most often, grouped to form larger units in intermediate vision.
Here, elements help to define the object and to “process andmake
sense of what would otherwise be a chaotic and overwhelming”
array of information (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 55). Late vision then
involves selecting regions to scrutinize or to give attention, as
well as evoking memories, attaching meaning, and assessing
foci of specific evolutionary importance (e.g., faces, landscapes)2.
Following recognition and assessment, evaluations are then
evoked as well as emotions.
This model also provides an important basis for empirically
approaching the role of the brain, with imaging studies having
identified regions tied to its posited stages (Nadal et al., 2008). It
affords a basis for making observations about how we progress
in viewing, and how particular aspects—in relation to the way
they are processed by the brain—impact judgments. For example,
it suggests that one first perceives formal elements due to their
importance in early and intermediate vision, while content is
typically assessed in later vision (Chatterjee, 2010). Further, the
model affords nuanced understanding of how processes may
integrate. For example, the process of taking initially diverse
perceptions from the first stage and grouping them within the
second may explain satisfaction or interest often generated by
complex art (Chatterjee, 2004), suggesting a “unity in diversity,”
which itself is a central idea in aesthetics.
The model also highlights the transition from automatic to
self-aware assessment. It is argued that the initial perception
of many formal features (e.g., attractiveness, beauty), as well as
intermediate grouping, occurs automatically (Chatterjee, 2010).
This is followed by memory-dependent processing, where the
perceiver’s knowledge and background experiences are activated,
and consequently, objects are identified, leading to experience-
defining outcomes that result from often effortful and focused
cognition, such as meaning-making and aesthetic judgments
(Tinio, 2013). Thus, a general progression from bottom-up
to top-down processing, and from low-level features to more
complex higher-order assessments of art, is illustrated. This
1For example, for early vision, Chatterjee (2004) argues that occipital cortex and
frontal-parietal attentional circuits play the most emphasis.
2Noted regions for late vision include: orbitofrontal cortex, insula, temporal pole,
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. These are connected to the interaction between
cognitive and emotional processes and monitoring of one’s own affective state.
approach does not imply a strictly linear “sequence” (Chatterjee,
2004). Rather, processes may often run in parallel, and the
individual may revisit or jump between stages (Nadal et al., 2008).
Model Outputs
This model affords opportunity for discussion of several impacts
from art (Zaidel et al., 2013 for similar review). First, the
model first focuses on reward value, which is connected to
numerous brain regions and specifically associated with the
generation of pleasant feelings in anticipation and response to
art (“Affect” in Figure 1)3. High-level top-down processes are
also involved in forming evaluative judgments and thus represent
another vital component of aesthetic experiences (Appraisal)4.
The model proposes a fluency or mastery-based assessment,
where success in processing leads to positive responses. Due
to its tie to brain function in reward and pleasure areas, the
model could potentially also account for Negative responses
here, which would presumably be linked to failing to place
and group visual aspects, although this had not been described
(we have made this addition in the Figure). The processing of
objects, extraction of prototypes, connection tomemory and final
decision would also presumably connect to meaning-making or
understanding (Meaning). Zaidel et al. (2013, p. 104) also note
that “neuroimaging studies have identified an enhancement of
cortical sensory processing”5 during aesthetic experiences. This
would involve attention and may be tied to physical Action (eye
movements), Physiology (relating to enhanced brain activity in
certain regions), and changes in perception (enabling perception
of new aspects or Novelty). This process may also include
self-awareness, monitoring of one’s affective state or conflict
resolution, which may play a role in bringing about final aesthetic
emotion and judgment.
The above three aspects are also connected to the possibility
for profound/Aesthetic experience. If intermediate processing
involves perceptions of specifically compelling or pleasing
qualities of an object (e.g., symmetry, balance, as well as content)
these qualities are argued to engage frontal-parietal attention
circuits. These networksmay continue tomodulate processing, as
an individual continues looking, within the ventral visual stream.
Thus, “a feed forward system,” as might be seen in the arrow
connecting early vision to attention, is established “in which the
attributes of an aesthetic object engage attention, and attention
further enhances the processing of these attributes” (Chatterjee,
2004, p. 55), leading to heightened engagement and pleasure.
This outcome may also be particularly unique for defining
aesthetic experiences (Nadal et al., 2008). We have suggested this
connection in our update to the model.
Chatterjee (2011) also suggests that the evolutionary or
biological basis for human fascination with art may be tied to
the interplay of three factors: (1) beauty, potentially linked to
3This impact is interpreted empirically from the involvement of subcortical
components of the reward circuit in aesthetic experiences, notably anterior
cingulate cortex.
4The model connected emotion to the anterior medial temporal lobe, medial
and orbitofrontal cortices, and subcortical structures which mediate emotion and
reward systems. Chatterjee (2010) connected appraisal to a widely distributed
network, most importantly the dorsolateral frontal and medial frontal cortices.
5In bilateral fusiform gyri, angular gyrus, and the superior parietal cortex.
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FIGURE 1 | Chatterjee model adapted from original visual model in Chatterjee (2004). Original elements shown in black. Additions not originally included in
model shown in blue. If possible, original wording has been retained or adapted from model author’s publications.
the evolutionary aspect of mate selection; (2) aesthetic attitude,
or mental processes involved when apprehending objects, and
which may connect with the idea of “prototypes” (presumably
in early vision) which are preferred and may influence
environmental navigation. Finally, (3) he notes cultural or
socially-derived concepts of “making special” (e.g., Dissayanake,
2008), where ordinary objects are transformed by the artist and
whereby the institutional frameworks that promote and display
art may tie to adaptive importance in enhancing cooperation and
continuity within human groups. This latter might then connect
to more longitudinal impacts (Social).
Inputs
Regarding inputs (primarily the blue arrows from the model left
side), Tinio (2013), in his review, notes that the intermediary
stage of vision should involve processing that recruits access to
memory and processing that involves higher-order cognitions
such as the perceiver’s knowledge and background experiences,
which may also influence the final stage of meaning-making.
Chatterjee (2004), referencing Ramachandran and Hirstein
(1999), also notes the importance of several artwork qualities. He
suggests that neural structures that evolved to respond to specific
visual stimuli respond more vigorously to primitives. This may
be both based on previous experience, while also explaining
the specific power of abstract art. In later theoretical work, he
explained how other design cues might further impact the viewer.
For example, artists might play with certain art-processing
elements—violating physics of shadows, reflections, colors,
and contours—thereby engendering specific brain responses
(Chatterjee, 2010). Artists’ use of complex interactions between
visual components within art may also create a specifically
powerful response by causing interplay between the dorsal
(“where”) and ventral (“what”) vision systems within the first and
second stages. Because the dorsal stream is sensitive to luminance
differences, motion, and spatial location, while the ventral stream
is sensitive to simple form and color, their interactionmay lead to
a shimmering quality of water or the sun’s glow on the horizon,
as in impressionist paintings (see also Livingstone, 2002).
Suggested Additions
Finally, in regards to possible additions, besides those discussed
above, the model is heavily influenced by both beauty and
visual research, as well as philosophical ideas of (e.g., Kantian)
disinterest (Vartanian and Nadal, 2007). While the emphasis
on detached reception and visual pleasure may adhere to
classical (pre-modern) art examples, it does not touch many
aspects of modern art experience. Notably this includes a more
robust or differentiated explanation for emotions, and negative
evaluations. While the integrated nature of the model does
allow for discussion of what brain areas may be tied to changes
in perception/emotion, there is no explanation of the driving
force that may bring these about. This is especially clear in
Chatterjee’s (2011) discussion of the evolutionary role of art.
As he explains, focusing on liking or other aesthetic judgment
as our sole focus would be maladaptive. If “the most profound
...experiences involve a refined liking, often described as awe
or feeling the sublime, in which wanting has been tossed aside,
[...and where] individuals lose themselves in the experience,”
the individual would be rendered “vulnerable”—“Entering an
aesthetic attitude is dangerous.” However, this does not take
into account adaptations in the viewer. Most notably, we would
recommend adding longitude changes (see box on far right),
relating to making special or Social/Health. We would also
suggest adding an indication of the “feed forward loop,” noted in
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the theoretical writing, and which appears to be placed between
decision and attention stages, as well as contextual aspects such as
perceiver and art qualities.
Locher et al.: Early and Intermediate Visual
Processing
Locher et al. (2007, 2010) also introduced a model, which deals
with early/intermediate processing, primarily driven by empirical
approaches to vision research. This model was conceived to
describe the relationship between eye movements and scan
patterns when processing visual art,6 and takes a somewhat
different approach to the model layout, centering on three
overlapping elements. The “person context” relates to both the
personality inputs and the internal processes of the viewer.
“Artifact context” refers to the physical aspects of the art. The
“interaction space” details the physical meeting of viewer and art,
mainly pertaining to eye movement and other outputs regarding
actions. For the purpose of unification with the other approaches,
we havemoved these inputs to themodel’s left side andmoved the
processing stages to the middle (Figure 2).
The model involves two processing stages: First, similar to
Chatterjee and following previous theory regarding vision (Marr,
1982; Rasche and Koch, 2002), Locher et al. argue that art
viewing, like other perception, begins with a rapid survey of the
global content of the pictorial field producing an initial “gist”
impression (e.g., Locher, 2015) of global structural organization,
composition and semantic meaning. This processing alone
can activate memories, lead to emotion, and contribute to a
first impression/evaluation. The detected gist information and
resulting impression then drive the second stage, involving a
more focused period of attention on form and functionality. This
stage also involves focus on details or specific aspects of pictorial
features in order to satisfy cognitive curiosity and to develop
aesthetic appreciation. Information is gathered by moving the
eyes over art in a sequence of rapid jumps, followed by fixations.
The authors posit that interaction in the second stage is
also driven by the “Central Executive” (blue box inside “person
context”)—consisting of “effortful control processes that direct
voluntary attention” in a top-down, cognitively driven manner
(Locher et al., 2010, p. 71). This also forms the “crucial interface”
between perception, memory, attention, and action (depicted in
the model’s box labeled “spatio-temporal aspects of encoding”),
and performs four important executive processes (following
Baddeley, 2007): focusing, dividing, or switching attention, and
providing a link between working and long-term memory. Thus
there is argued to be a continuous, dynamic bottom-up/top-
down interaction inside the Central Executive, involving assessed
properties (form) and functionality of the object, and “viewer
sensory-motor-perceptual” (i.e., visual) processes, as well as
viewer cognitive structure. “Thus, as an aesthetic experience
progresses, the artifact presents continually changing, ‘action
driven’ affordances” (Locher et al., 2010, p. 71). These “influence
the timing, rhythm, flow, and feel of the interaction.” Ultimately,
6More recently, Locher et al. (2010) integrated this model with consideration of
the tactile and sensual aspects of the handling of object and assessment of its use,
geared toward discussion of commercial, design products. However, the present
discussion will focus only on visual aspects.
“together the top-down and bottom-up component processes
underlying thought and action create both meaning and aesthetic
quality,” defining art experience. Like many of the other authors,
Locher et al. note both automatic andmore deliberate processing.
Especially in the first phase, many aspects specific to a work—
complexity, symmetry, organizational balance—are argued to
be detected “automatically or pre-attentively by genetically
determined, hard-wired” mechanisms (p. 73).
Outputs
The model especially involves focus on eye movements (Action).
The authors’ research—using eye tracking, as well as museum
based observations and participant descriptions—specifically
shows evidence for the initial gist processing, relating to a
movement of the eyes over a large visual area and showing
attention to elements perceived as compositional units (Locher
et al., 2007; see also Locher and Nodine, 1987; Locher, 1996;
Nodine and Krupinski, 2003). They also showed a later switch to
focus on details as well as expressiveness and style/form elements.
This also gives new evidence for discussion of Appraisal and
Meaning-making, which can result from this sequential looking.
They note that the stage of early processing can itself play an
important role in these outcomes. Further, within their most
recent model discussion, the authors classify three channels
of information that one might create. These are composed
of functional or conceptual information, inherent information
(via affordances communicated in the object), and augmented
information, presumably that which is changed or developed
through viewing (Novelty). These outcomes would most likely
come through directed looking in the second stage. The authors
also note that emotion (Affect) may be evoked throughout the
viewing process, however, they do not address how.
Inputs
The model notably argues for “two driving forces”: the “artifact
itself ” and a “person context that reflects the user’s cognitive
structures” (Locher et al., 2010, p. 72). With respect to
the artwork, the authors (2010, p. 73) cite research (e.g.,
Creusen and Schoormans, 2005), which suggests “at least six
ways” in which appearance influences evaluation and choice,
including conveying aesthetic and symbolic value, providing
quality impression, functional characteristics and ease of use,
drawing attention via novelty, and communicating “ease of
categorization.”
Regarding the viewer, the authors note that this input
“contains several types of [acquired] information (semantic,
episodic, and strategic),” and is also the “repository of one’s
personality, motivations, and emotional state,” all of which
influence, in a top-down fashion, how viewers “perceive,” and
“evaluate” (Locher et al., 2010, p. 73). They note that this might
play a role in the second phase, where memory “spontaneously
activates subsets of featural and semantic information in
the user’s knowledge base,” including the user’s level of
aesthetic sophistication, experience, tastes, education, culture,
and personality. In addition, they note that “individuals are
capable of rapidly detecting and categorizing learned properties
of a stimulus,” for example characteristics of the artistic style and a
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FIGURE 2 | Locher model (adapted from Locher, 1996; Locher et al., 2010).
composition’s pleasantness and interestingness. “These responses
occur by a rapid and direct match in activated memory between
the structural features of an art object... and a viewer’s knowledge”
(p. 76). They also suggest that emotion itself may be an input.
Locher (2015) also suggests that expertise of a viewer may play a
particularly important role in the initial gist impression as well.
For example, experts may give more importance to the initial
impression and resulting affective reaction when appraising value
or authenticity of artworks.
Locher et al. (2010) furthermore note importance of context.
This includes social-cultural and socio-economic factors related
to the object, its historical significance, symbolic associations and
social value. These “contribute to a user’s self-perception of his
or her cultural taste” or aspirations (p. 78). These aspects are
also argued to influence art interaction in a cognitively-driven,
top-down fashion. However, the actual tie to outcomes is not
discussed. Other mentioned factors include the environment,
available time for viewing, and previous mood or exposures.
For example, they cite studies in which individuals were primed
by giving candy, resulting in better mood, which positively
influenced evaluations, attention to details, and more balanced
patterns of eye movement.
Additions
An integration of the discussion of action/eye-movement with
emotion or evaluations would be useful. The authors also tend
to place most aspects within the second stage and do not
explain how possible sequences or patterns might lead to certain
outputs within experience, nor how experience changes. This
may also be a result of the lack of defined temporal flow in
the model design. Interestingly, when Locher et al. (2007) gave
individuals the opportunity to verbalize their initial gist reaction
(roughly the first seven seconds), they did not find changes
in the way individuals described artworks after this period,
raising questions regarding the present delineation between stage
one and two. They also do not consider longitudinal aspects.
Better explanation of “augmented information”—one of the three
channels of information argued to be created from looking in
stage two—might give a point of entry for this. Further, in
their empirical support for the model and its outputs, they note
that their artworks were created by renowned artists “and are,
therefore, presumably visually right” (Locher et al., 2007, p. 74).
However, this raises the question of what makes a work “right,”
and how less visually-successful art might be processed.
Leder et al.: Intermediate Stages and
Aesthetic Appreciation and Judgments
Amodel that has its strengths in linking early and late processing,
with focus on intermediate stages, is that of Leder and colleagues
(Leder et al., 2004; updated in Leder, 2013; Leder and Nadal,
2014). This has also become perhaps the most prominent
approach for empirical study (Vartanian and Nadal, 2007).
Based largely on the cognitive work of Kreitler, Kreitler, and
Berlyne above (Leder et al., 2005), their model considers art
experience as a series of information-processing stages, focusing
largely on perceptual attunement to various formal factors in
art. However, it also integrates this sensory information with
“conceptual and abstracted” meaning (p. 12) as well as emotion
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and body responses. As shown in Figure 3, after an initial pre-
classification (most presumably regarding situational context),
the model proposes five stages (Leder et al., 2004), occurring in
sequence: (1) “perceptual analysis,” where an object is initially
subjected to analysis of low-level visual features (e.g., shape,
contrast); followed by (2) “implicit memory integration,” in
which art is processed via previous experiences, expertise, and
particular schema held by the viewer. This is followed by (3)
an “explicit classification,” where one attunes to conceptual
or formal/artistic factors, such as content and style, and (4)
“cognitive mastering,” in which one creates and/or discovers
meaning by making interpretations, associations, and links
to existing knowledge. The process ends in (5) a stage of
“evaluation,” where processing outcomes combine, culminating
in both aesthetic judgment and the potential for “aesthetic
emotions.” Themodel also makes a distinction between “explicit”
and “implicit” processing (see timeline), with the first two (or
possibly three) stages occurring automatically or with little
conscious awareness (Tinio, 2013). In latter stages, there is then a
component of self-aware or self-referential processing, where the
perceiver “evaluates his affective state and uses this information
to stop the processing once a satisfactory state is achieved” (Leder
et al., 2004, p. 502).
This model offers a number of advancements from previous
work. Because all stages feed into a continuously updated state
(Leder et al., 2004), it affords a more holistic understanding
of how one comes to evaluations or responses. In addition it
incorporates a number of factors—emotion, viewer experience,
and formal aspects of artworks—to these stages, which partially
influence final results. Thus, themodel can be used for both a top-
down, mechanism-based evaluation of the general processing of
art, or for bottom-up, experience-based testing of hypotheses
for specific sequences that may inform particular varieties of
response (Vartanian and Nadal, 2007). Because of its emphasis
on fundamental cognitive mechanisms, the model has also been
used in a number of areas outside art—e.g., design, dance, and
music (Leder, 2013 for review).
Outputs
Primarily, this model proposes two outputs—aestheticAppraisal
and Affect. These are mainly explained as a result of successful
visual/cognitive processing. The authors claim that part of
the pleasure derived from looking is the feeling of having
grasped the meaning, thus understanding an artwork results in
reward-related brain activation. Looking at Figure 3, emotion or
assessment come about by moving through each stage, especially
“cognitive mastery,” to a successful end. This argument is in
keeping with a number of approaches—most notably Berlyne’s
concept of curiosity/interest and Bartlett’s (1932) (1932; see Belke
et al., 2010) “effort after meaning”—which stress importance of
intellectual engagement or understanding as core dimensions
of positive response. The model also notes meaning-making
(Meaning), suggesting that this comes through classification
and implicit memory integration in which one connects a
specific work to an interpretation. Finally, the model accounts
for profound or Aesthetic experience. This is argued to derive
from the natural extrapolation of the cognitive mastery process,
whereby the more completely one can master a work, the more
harmonious and pleasurable the outcome, occasionally to the
extent that one experiences a pleasurable, “flow”-type experience
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Leder et al., 2004).
Inputs
The model also mentions several inputs (left side, Figure 1).
Primarily, the stages of implicit memory integration and explicit
classification are argued to be influenced by previous art
experience—determining whether one first sees, for example,
a “post-impressionist work,” a “sunflower,” or a “Van Gogh”
(Belke et al., 2010). Previous experience or expertise also
impact assessments of prototypicality and fluency within the
second stage—which influence positive/negative emotions and
evaluations (Leder et al., 2004, 2005). Explicit classification also
involves processing of style and content, driven by personal
viewer characteristics such as knowledge and taste (Leder et al.,
2005; also Hager et al., 2012) and understanding of art historical
context (e.g., see Bullot and Reber, 2013). More recently, an
updated discussion of the model in regards to emotion (Leder
et al., 2015) suggested that the switch between aesthetic or more
pragmatic approaches in “explicit classification”may be driven by
a check of one’s desires for emotion or mood state. In cognitive
mastering, where meaning is extracted, lay persons may also be
more likely to draw on self-related interpretations like feelings,
personal memories, or experience, while experts may rely more
on art-specific style or concepts (Augustin and Leder, 2006;
Hager et al., 2012, p. 321). Leder (2013) extends this even to
classifying objects as “Art.” He notes that top-down classification
before the actual episode, may affect experience by engaging
an aesthetic mode, regulating hedonic expectations, and thus
modulating intensity of emotion or interest.
Additions
In regards to the actual outcome of viewing art, the exact relation
of specific emotions or evaluations to certain given inputs largely
remains unclear. As also noted by Leder (2013), there is need
of a more integrated explanation of how emotion or other
physiological responses might tie to processing experience.While
the model notes the role of personality and experience as a driver
of outcomes, and the specific stages where self components may
have an impact, it does not consider how these aspects are actually
integrated or acted upon within psychological experience (see
also Silvia below)7. There is also need for more explanation of
how art-viewing can alter perceptions or understanding within
experience (Novelty, Transcendence, Self Adjustment). While
acknowledging potential for such results, it remains unclear what
must happen within specific encounters for a change of the next
viewing moment or the next experience. Presumably, the process
7Locher et al. (2007, p. 76) also question some of this model’s arguments regarding
location of processing aspects within its stages. In a study where participants were
asked to view paintings and give a running oral report of their processing, Locher
et al. noted that some participants’ “initial reactions to the artworks would be
classified as occurring in stage 4 ... involve[ing] deliberate (top-down) self-related
interpretations.” Locher et al. argued that their findings suggest that reactions
“may occur muchmore rapidly and automatically than predicted.... suggesting that
[individuals] are able to make a rapid evaluation of a picture’s content and aesthetic
appeal.”
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FIGURE 3 | Leder model (adapted from Leder et al., 2004; Leder and Nadal, 2014).
might follow our additions (far right: Figure 3), where specific
mastery in one encounter (or even within one stage), mediated by
positive feedback or emotion/evaluation, would allow one to add
to memories/experiences, which would then modify the self. A
related output might also be posited for art’s longitudinal impacts
(Social, Health).
Another issue involves disruptions. Recent work by Leder’s
group (Jakesch and Leder, 2009) has shown the importance
of ambiguity or breakdowns in the mastery process. This is
displayed in the “evaluation” stage, andmay create amore intense
experience by causing one to undergo another loop of the model.
However, the specifics of how these arise and create intense vs.,
for example, negative reactions could be more fully addressed. As
it stands, the model appears to afford only a one-way mechanism
for improving mastery, which leads to pleasurable experience.
This raises the question of how one overcomes difficulty or finds
new interpretations (Leder, 2013). The model has also not been
connected to specific negative outcomes or physical action. These
could presumably be placed as one more component of affective
state (bottom).
The Late Stages: Silvia et al.: Appraisal
Theory and Emotion with Art
Several approaches also expand past the models above to
consider in more detail later processing elements. First, the
work of Silvia (e.g., Silvia, 2005a,b) specifically builds on the
ideas of Leder, emphasizing information processing and visual
art. However, Silvia’s approach focuses on the mechanisms
for arriving at specific emotions and artwork assessments,
while it simultaneously questions previous psychobiological,
prototypicality, and processing fluency approaches.
Silvia (Silvia and Brown, 2007) argues that past processing
theories had two major limitations: First, their use of fluency or
typicality as a main determinate of positive or negative reactions
leads to difficulties in explaining why specific emotions would
arise beyond this basic affect. Specifically, previous theories could
not discriminate between emotions. At best, they proposed an
undifferentiated feeling of aversion or interest. Second, reactions
to works could be both positive or negative, but this would
depend on other contextual factors such as personality rather
than just ability to fluently process. Further, it is especially
“hard to derive” what feelings arise from not-fluent or non-
prototypical interactions with art (Reber et al., 2004). In response,
Silvia proposed an approach based in appraisal theory (e.g.,
Scherer et al., 2006) that connects reactions with the personal
relationship between viewer and art. He argues that each emotion
has a distinct appraisal structure or set of evaluations that evoke
the response. These evaluations are inherently contextual and
subjective, with the central assumption being that evaluations,
not the object, are the local cause of experience.
As shown in Figure 4, where we have produced a model
based on his arguments, Silvia proposes that responses can be
broken into two main components: (1) There is a “novelty
check” (Silvia, 2005a, p. 122), which is connected to processing of
“collative” factors (following Berlyne)—referring to the relative
understandability, interestingness or uniqueness of art. This is
also tied to the matching of object to the existing schema or
expectations of the viewer, andmight be further divided into both
basic “congruence” and the relevance that the object or the act of
matching has to one’s goals or self (Silvia and Brown, 2007), with
the output being a feeling of relative ease and understanding. (2)
There is also “coping potential,” or estimate of relative control
or efficacy within the situation itself (Silvia, 2005a). Throughout
his writing, he also includes a third factor, relating to (3) relative
importance of the object/situation to the self.
For example, in the case of interest (Silvia, 2005a, 2006), the
appraisal structure would consist of: (1) a judgment of high
novelty/complexity (i.e., low schema congruence), combined
with (2) high coping potential, and (3) low self relevance or
little importance for one’s goals or expectations and thus low
perceived threat. In contrast, anger (Cooper and Silvia, 2009)
would combine appraising an event as (1) inconsistent with one’s
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FIGURE 4 | Silvia model (created by the authors for this paper).
schema (low schema congruence), but also (2) with low coping
potential (e.g., as action beyond one’s control) and (3) closely tied
to one’s goals/self. Because of this structure, Silvia concludes that
in any situation, different people will have different responses
to these processing checks, and thus different emotions to the
same stimulus, or the same person may even have different
emotions depending on context (Silvia, 2005a). Like Leder, Silvia
also emphasizes that responses need not require overt awareness.
Outputs
This model also makes an important contribution, especially
regarding art impact. The two main outcomes, as in the above
models, are Affect and Appraisal. Silvia however adds to the
previous models by proposing pathways for specific reactions
(Silvia and Warburton, 2006), giving a frame for empirical
assessment of experience. By assessing the processing checks
noted above, typically via Likert-type assessments,8 the model
can explain why people have different emotions to the same
event, and why different personality traits, skills, and values can
predict responses (Silvia and Brown, 2007). This also enables
movement beyond simple pleasure and preference, to surprise,
confusion (Silvia and Nusbaum, 2011) as well as Negative
responses such as anger, disgust, contempt (Silvia, 2009). As
shown in Figure 5, these are specifically explained as arising
from low congruency and differences in relative coping and
self relevance. Beyond emotion, Silvia also groups outputs into
clusters (Cooper and Silvia, 2009, p. 111), noting that appraisal
8Silvia specifically identified a set of key evaluations for identifying congruency,
coping, and self-relevance (preference, uncertainty, level of disruption, novelty,
complexity, interest).
theories “are componential theories,” which include facial, vocal,
postural expressions or other Actions, as well as Physiological
response.
The model also posits categories of responses that specifically
tie to different self-art relations. He notes “knowledge emotions”
(interest, confusion, surprise), which are tied to intellectual
matching of stimuli to schema, typically in high coping
contexts. “Hostile emotions” (anger, disgust, contempt), hinge
on threat to goals/self. “Self-conscious” emotions (pride, shame,
embarrassment) tie to appraising events as congruent or
incongruent with one’s goals, and are also viewed as being
caused by oneself rather than external events (Silvia, 2009).
In the knowledge emotion category, Silvia (2009, p. 49) also
notes the role of meta-cognitive reflection on the self. These
emotions “stem from people’s appraisals of what they know,
what they expect to happen, and what they think they can learn
and understand.” With self-conscious emotions, “to experience
feelings like pride, shame, guilt, regret... [we] must have a sense
of self and the ability to reflect upon what the self has done”
(p. 50). In both cases this reflection might act as a conduit
to Adjustment/learning and/or creation of Meaning. Especially
knowledge emotions may “motivate learning, thinking, and
exploring, actions that foster the growth of knowledge” (Silvia,
2006, p. 140), and would come about as an output of one model
cycle. It is also presumably through the earlier matching of
schema to art—or rather in mismatches, paired with acceptable
levels of coping/relevance—that one encounters Novelty or
changed perception.
In the discussion of hostile emotional responses, the role
of the self relates to attack on identity or schema. Responses
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FIGURE 5 | Pelowski model (adapted from Pelowski and Akiba, 2011).
stem from a “deliberate trespass” (Silvia, 2009, p. 49) against
one’s goals/values. These responses are tied to action that
is often given as a means of maintaining or protecting the
self, motivating aggression and self-assertion (Silvia, 2009).
Finally, he notes potential longitudinal impact (Self Adj.),
claiming “a consistent finding ...is that training in art affects
people’s emotional responses... [and] changes people’s emotional
responses by changing how they think about art” (Silvia, 2006, p.
140). He links this especially to knowledge emotions experienced
in the art processing experience.
Inputs
Silvia also explicitly connects responses with inputs, specifically
personality. He notes that perhaps the most important aspect
is how events relate to important goals or values (Silvia and
Brown, 2007). This was empirically considered, for example, in
his finding of changes in correlation between complexity/coping
and interest depending on other individual personality factors
(Silvia, 2005a). Elsewhere, in a study on chills and absorption,
Silvia found that people high in “openness to experience” as
well as art expertise reported more such responses (Silvia and
Nusbaum, 2011, p. 208).
Adjustments
Questions remain, especially regarding the ordering of the three
assessment checks. Specifically, while previous writing tends to
present them with only a rough order, one could argue that
this would most likely not be the case. One might question
whether there is a primacy of assessment for either schema
congruence or self relevance. It could be argued that with
low relevance, the outcome of the congruence check has little
meaning. On the other hand, individuals may be predisposed
to constant checks of congruence, relating to basic processing
or self-preservation, and thus this assessment may often come
first. Another question regards when and how we reflect on
our experience. While Silvia does explain reactions in terms of
self-related assessments, he does not detail exactly what kind of
mechanism this would require. This is most clear in discussion of
hostile reactions. Arguing against prior fluency or prototypicality
approaches, Cooper and Silvia (2009, p. 113) claim “it seems
unlikely” that people have hostile reactions to art “because they
find it insufficiently pleasing, prototypical, meaningful.” Instead,
“people appraise art in ways that evoke hostile emotions, ...
in short, some art makes some people mad.” However, this
argument is rather circular. Therefore, it would be useful to go
one step further, and visually articulate—within a model—why
this might be so at the individual level. Similar discussions could
also be made of specific actions or body responses. His approach
also does not divide between automatic and more reflective
experience. This question, he notes is “an intriguing, cutting-
edge area of appraisal research” (Silvia, 2005b, p. 6). While
noting that we might be changed from our experience and that
emotional responses may change throughout art exposure, there
is no explanation of how this might develop within experience
itself (Silvia, 2006).
Pelowski et al.: Discrepant and
Transformative Reactions to Art
The model of Pelowski (Pelowski and Akiba, 2009, 2011) was
also conceived as an extension of the Leder approach, with the
addition of some appraisal theory elements, and attempts to
refocus on the specific discussion of changes or evolutions in
responses within the art interaction experience.
Pelowski et al. argue against a typical emphasis on harmony,
fluency, or immediate understanding, and instead advocate a
more labored process of discrepancy and subsequent adjustment.
Pelowski and Akiba (2011) note that many past discussions of
art experience—both theoretical and anecdotal—involve some
means of disruption or break from the flow of everyday life
experience. It is these untypical reactions that are argued to
actually constitute the impact and importance of art, acting to
disrupt a viewer’s pre-expectations and forcing upon them a
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new means of perception or insight (see also Pelowski et al.,
2012; Muth et al., 2015 for similar argument). Yet, these very
qualities are often eliminated from the study of art perception.
They further argue that models have come to “equate art
perception to either an emotional/empathic alignment of viewer
to artist or artwork” or to a cognitive “assessment of an
artwork’s ...information” via matching of schema to the object of
perception, leaving models “without a means of accounting for
fundamental change within art experience” (Pelowski and Akiba,
2011, p. 82). Like Silvia, they also argue that current approaches
cannot describe how individuals arrive at specific reactions,
limiting researchers’ ability to unite cognitive, emotional, and
evaluative reactions within experience.
Their model (Figure 5) posits five stages, beginning with a
specific conception of expectations or viewer identity. Pelowski
and Akiba (2011, p. 87) argues that viewers carry “fundamental
meanings regarding themselves, other persons, objects, or
behaviors—‘Who am I?’ ‘What is art?’ ‘How does art relate
to me?”’ which collectively combine to form what they refer
to as the “ideal self image.” Updating previous work by
Carver (1996), Pelowski and Akiba (2011) specifically posit a
theoretical construction for this self, which can be considered
as a hierarchical pyramid with core traits (“be goals”) at the
top, and branching down to expectations for general actions
(“do goals”), and further subdivided into more specific schema.
Through connection of low-level schema to core ideas of the self,
all action (such as viewing art) then involves application of this
structure. This occurs in tandem with human drives to protect
the self image, through cognitive filters that lead attention away
from potentially damaging information. Thus “success or failure
in perception, as well as what individuals can [initially] perceive
or understand, are a result of this postulate system” (pp. 85–87),
and provide the mechanism for understanding reaction to art.
The authors then propose three main outcomes. First,
individuals attempt to successfully match schema to art by
classifying and understanding, coinciding with the “cognitive
mastery” in the Leder model. They also acknowledge that
this outcome is a general goal of most experience, and may
induce pleasure, harmony, or even flow-type states. However,
because this outcome marks a matching of schema to perception,
mastery also would coincide with a “facile” reaction to art,
reinforcing previous expectations and cutting off possibility for
new perception or insight. Moving past this point, they argue,
requires some “discrepancy” within experience. This can involve
any number of aspects—e.g., between expectations for perception
and art, between meaning and prior concepts, between bodily
reactions and expectations for how one should act. In each
case discrepancy acts to “bump” an individual out of their
preconceived frame (Pelowski et al., 2014, p. 4), forcing response
or adjustment.
Upon discrepancy, the model then posits that individuals
move to a “secondary control” stage in which they try to diminish
or escape from the discrepant element. This is accompanied
by actions—e.g., re-classifying art as bad or meaningless,
diminishing importance of the encounter, or physically moving
away—which avoid a questioning of higher-order aspects of the
self image, and also explain the negative emotional or evaluative
experiences sometimes had with art. On the other hand, if
viewers persist, they may instead eventually alter their own
schema in order to better approach the art. This is argued to
be most likely when art-viewing has a fundamental tie to the
self (representing a higher order goal) and one cannot easily
escape (Pelowski and Akiba, 2011). This change also coincides
with a shift from direct perception to a more meta-cognitive
perspective, in which viewers give up previous attempts at
control, acknowledge discrepancy, and eventually create new
schema for viewing the art. They conclude that it is this process
whereby one “transforms” the self, that can be connected to
change, novelty, or insight, and coincides with highly positive
emotion, and deepened or harmonious engagement.
Outputs
This model is especially important for explaining both highly
positive (Aesthetic), and Negative, as well as insightful or Novel
and Transcendent reactions. The model also unites these within
one progressive experience. It is argued that in order to arrive
at the final outcome a viewer moves through all antecedent stages
(Pelowski et al., 2012). In this vein, one of the model’s key benefits
is its division into specific stages, tied to application, protection
or adjustment of the self. Thus the authors can attach general
theory regarding various reactions noted for each of these events
(see also Leder, 2013). Notably, they suggest emotion or Affect,
which, following Silvia, would arise in specific clusters depending
on the positive or negative experience of applying the self. They
argue that empirical analysis of viewing art would be expected
to show a progression from no emotion in the facile stage, to
confusion, anxiety, and tension, followed by anger in secondary
control, and finally self-awareness, epiphany, or happiness in
the aesthetic stage. This division has also been supported by
recent empirical evidence (Pelowski et al., 2012; Pelowski, 2015).
Similar results are also tied to Physiology, specifically heart rate
and skin conductance. They argue that the first stage should
show little physiological response, while secondary control
would lead to sympathetic (fight or flight), schema change to
both parasympathetic and sympathetic, and the final stage to
parasympathetic return to homeostasis. This final outcome was
also recently tied to crying (Pelowski, 2015). They also suggest
specific Action (need to leave) in the “secondary control” stage.
Regarding Appraisal, they also argue that evaluation ending
in cognitive mastery may reveal appraisals that aid in ignoring
or assimilating discrepancy (Pelowski and Akiba, 2011). On the
other hand, in secondary control, self-protectionary strategies
would manifest in negative hedonic appraisals, as well as lower
“potency or activity” (e.g., Osgood et al., 1957). They further
consider Meaning, dividing outcomes into three modes: (1)
initial assessment for surface or mimetic qualities in cognitive
mastery, (2) meaninglessness in secondary control, and (3) “a
fundamental change in viewer-stimuli relation” in the last stages,
where art meaning is tied to metacognitive reflection on its
impact and the preceding psychological experience (Pelowski
et al., 2012, p. 249).
The model is also particularly unique in its explanation
of changes or transformation with art. Recently, Pelowski
et al. (2014) connected this outcome to goals of museum/art
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education, and pointed out its equivalence to discussions of
insight or creativity. By breaking from the mastery process
through the introduction of meta-cognitive assessment and
schema-change, followed by re-engaging in final mastery
with a new set of schema, they argue, “we introduce a
means of explaining the transcendental quality of art” and of
“connecting the existing conception of mastery to ...novelty and
personal growth” (Pelowski and Akiba, 2011, p. 90). They also
posit longitudinal impact, tied to changes in schema or the
“hierarchical self.” Especially the aesthetic outcomemaymanifest
in re-evaluation of a viewer’s own self image, which may be
detectible in paired self-evaluations before and after viewing (Self
Adj.). They also argue that both the abortive or transformative
outcome may cause change in individual’s relationship with the
class of art or artists, involving hedonic and potency evaluations
(Social), and may spur individuals to seek out/avoid other
encounters.
Inputs
Regarding inputs, the model considers the role of specific
expectations or personality, and goes further to place these within
a theory of the self. The authors note that “those who have
a strong relationship to a stimulus, or high expectations for
success... are [more] likely to find themselves in the intractable
position” leading to aesthetic experience (Pelowski et al., 2012,
pp. 246–247). This might be tied to training in the arts, or
might affect those who identify as art lovers, who have a high
need to find meaning in artworks, or who have the general
need for control. More recently, the authors have also taken
into account the physical and social situation, noting that the
environment, especially when one is among others who one
considers more knowledgeable, may be likely to evoke facile
or negative experience, tying to a need for protecting the self
(Pelowski et al., 2014).
Additions
At the same time, the model has a conceptual focus, laying
emphasis on schema and overlooking much of the way
individuals might often respond to art (basic perceptions,
mimetic evaluations, or pre-reflective experience). A recent
review (Leder, 2013) also noted that it is “more descriptive
than formalized,” requiring transformation into “more operative
versions with process-based rules,” quantifying what feature of a
representation at one stage affects latter stages.
Cupchik: Detached/Aesthetic and
Pragmatic Approaches to Art
Finally, the theories of Cupchik have also not yet been placed
into a unified model, but have individually been instrumental in
empirical art research. These also involve several themes which
can be connected to form an understanding of art experience,9
and thus were deemed an ideal target for this paper (Figure 6).
Similar to other cognitive approaches, Cupchik views art
experience as a meeting of object, environment, and personality
9Cupchik himself made this acknowledgment and suggestion that his work might
be fit into a cohesive model in a recent retrospective address concerning his body
of research (2011, p. 320).
factors (Cupchik and Gignac, 2007). In order to understand
their interaction, a main theme regards two modes of responses
(Cupchik, 2011, p. 321): “everyday pragmatic” and “aesthetic.”
The way that these modes are integrated, and often which
of the two the viewer employs, determine the outcomes of
experience. The pragmatic involves a predominantly cognitive,
schema-based assessment, in which one assesses meaning and
significance. The “aesthetic,” on the other hand, involves
integrating context, memory, and physical/sensory qualities
“associated with style and symbolic information” (p. 321).
This involves a more reactive or “holistic” appraisal “in which
specific codes for interpreting are bound with affective responses
that map onto dimensions of pleasure or arousal.” Cupchik
(2006, 2013) also posits an alternative naming for this division,
suggesting a contrast between “subjective engagement” and
“objective detachment.”While subjective engagement is based on
intense personal responses, objective detachment reflects a more
intellectual treatment10.
In engaging art, one may switch between modes in response
to different information or one’s processing experience. Cupchik
(2011, 2013) notes that the two modes’ “extreme conditions”
can also lead to unwanted experience. This would involve
either “underdistancing,” in which subject matter reminds us
of troubling aspects of our personal lives, or causes unwanted
emotion, or “overdistancing,” when design aspects push one
too far away (as in some avant-garde art), with little emotional
involvement (Kemp and Cupchik, 2007). The most pleasant
responses may occur when individuals find an “aesthetic middle”
(Fechner, 1978) between absorption and detachment—“utmost
decrease of distance without its disappearance” (Cupchik, 2006,
p. 217). Cupchik (2013) also argued that one appeal of art is the
opportunity at reconciliation between modes. While he argues
that it is not possible to be in both modes at the same time,
we can “shift rapidly between the two” (2011, p. 321). Thus, it
is “the capacity of a work of art to be grasped, elaborated, and
experienced in several systems” that makes it compelling (p. 294).
Outputs
The model can further be articulated through its discussion of
outputs. First is its discussion of Appraisal, which it connects
to the aesthetic or reactive mode. Cupchik notes potential for
Meaning making, via reflective and/or pragmatic processing.
Affect is also noted. In an earlier publication, Cupchik (1993,
p. 179) suggested that two kinds of emotional processes might
in fact be distinguished, which would coincide with either
the analytical/schema-based or holistic/experiential processing
modes. These can be termed “dimensional” and “category”
reactions. The former are closely tied to bodily states of
pleasure/arousal caused by a particular stimulus. The latter
pertain “to primary emotions,” such as happiness, interest,
surprise, fear, anger, and emphasizing spontaneity or empathic
reaction to art. More recently, Cupchik (2011, p. 321) suggested
that the former affect type may accompany aesthetic experiences
“from the first moment of perception,” giving as evidence
studies involving displaying artworks of differing complexities
10See also Cupchik (1995) in which he also uses the terms “reactive” and “reflective”
approaches.
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FIGURE 6 | Cupchik model (created by the authors for this paper).
or affective contents for very short durations, and where
participants would avoid a second viewing based on their ability
to detect lack of order or unwanted emotional valence11. In
turn, the primary emotions are associated with longer exposure
durations “that enable a person to situate the work in the context
of life experiences” (Cupchik and Gignac, 2007). He also notes
that this often touches the reflective mode of appraising, which
is more closely related to emotions linked to the self (Cupchik,
2011). He suggests that both cases may lead to Negative affect.
This would come from either: (1) difficulty in initially processing
art, leading to hedonic aversion through the reactive/aesthetic
mode, (2) “under-distancing,” where the work is too close to
one’s self and/or a troubling situation, or (3) negatively perceived
content in art as processed in the reflective mode.
Cupchik (2011, p. 321) also argues for adaptive impact
from emotional art response (Self Adj.), noting especially
“primary emotions” have adaptive value, “because they link the
person to meaningful situations.” In turn, the reflective mode
(Cupchik, 2011, p. 321) can be related to the principle of
“emotional elaboration,” which implies that a person searches
for underlying layers of meaning, in part due to the prompting
from their affective experience, and might be connected to
growth/self-adjustment (Kemp and Cupchik, 2007). Especially
when individuals are able to find the proper emotional distance,
they may enter a state in which they break from a “normal
outlook” and achieve new points of view or approaches (Cupchik,
2006, p. 216). He also suggests that this can lead to a state
of consciousness involving “suspension in the experience of
11He goes on to argue that this “clearly showed that the interaction of cognitive
and affective processes in aesthetic perception take place holistically within the
first glance” and thus contradicts Zajonc’s (e.g., Zajonc, 2000) assumption that
preferences are often unmediated by cognitive processing (Cupchik, 2006, p.
212–213). This is a debate for another paper.
time—a frozen moment in which the person and the work
become one” (Cupchik, 2013, p. 85). This event then might
be connected to Aesthetic experiences, as well as Novelty and
Transformation. His idea of aesthetic engagement has the
posited impact of returning an individual to homeostasis or
harmonious interaction with the environment, which might
serve as an avenue to longitudinal impact (Health).
At the same time, Cupchik andWroblewski-Raya (1998, p. 65)
note that while art can be used for wish fulfillment or revelation,
it can also evoke “ego-defense.” “The subject matter ...might also
resonate with unresolved issues and needs.” This might lead to
a “defensive intellectualizing response” in which the individual
escapes or avoids processing, by, for example, focusing on its style
or other benign elements. This could also lead to an adaptive
moment. “The artwork ...mirrors the person’s life and externalizes
what has been a private concern,” thereby providing “tension
release.” This may involve ability to adopt some distance, which
“permits the person to experience the emotion without having to
address its consequences.”12 This too might connect to a change
in perception (Novelty) or insight, while the former outcome
may lead to Negative emotion/responses. Cupchik (2006) also
notes that while one can of course employ a pragmatic approach,
in order to appreciate art as “Art,” one must shift to an aesthetic
frame.
Inputs
Regarding inputs, Cupchik primarily notes personality. For
example, in an empirical study (see Cupchik and Gignac, 2007)
he showed the impact of previous experience when determining
what aspects a viewer might attend to, concluding that art-naive
12Shown empirically by Kemp and Cupchik (2007) who presented viewers in a
negative state with a range of positive and negative paintings, and who found that
viewers wanted to see the paintings with negative themes a second time, primarily
however, “because they evoked thoughts rather than feelings.”
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viewers generally focus on subject matter because it is easier to
discern than style. The latter is more likely to be attended to by
experts, which he connects with a reflective mode and desire for
challenge13. On the other hand, much like Leder, he discusses the
importance of previous experience when adopting an “aesthetic”
mode. Individuals “bring appropriate codes of interpretation and
engagement. [One takes] this for granted until encountering a
new form of artistic expression,” which individuals do not know
how to respond to (Cupchik, 2013, p. 73). Cupchik (2006, p. 214)
also notes the present and/or desired affective state may play
a role in art selection and attention. “People can intentionally
modulate their states of pleasure or arousal by selecting stimuli
that possess a needed quality.” This “wish fulfillment” (Cupchik
and Wroblewski-Raya, 1998, p. 65) might itself be largely
involved when we take a “reactive” mode of appraising art,
allowing return to homeostasis (Cupchik, 2011). Finally, Cupchik
(2013, p. 85) notes the implicit role of personality in discussion
of more profound or harmonious experiences. He suggests that
proper distancing may come through cases where “a work
expressively embodies a person’s sense of identity.” Onemay alter
the mode of appraisal to escape from implications raised by art.
He showed this by confronting viewers, who identified as lonely,
with paintings depicting lonely scenes, and who were more likely
to focus on style than content (Cupchik and Wroblewski-Raya,
1998).
Additions
Unclear aspects regard the two modes of appraisal. Much of
Cupchik’s discussion implies that these modes might occur
roughly in parallel, or that individuals can actively select which
mode to employ. However, his research on short and long time
sequences seems to imply that we immediately take a reactive
approach to assess the basic object. This would seem to fit to the
work of Leder, Chatterjee etc. This raises the question of whether
one mode might influence the other or how this might occur.
Even more, his discussion of under-distancing and its ability to
lead to ego defense or learning and growth, might imply a switch
between an initial reactive to a reflective mode, at a late stage
of experience. It may be useful to parse what would be these
outcomes’ differences.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper had the goal of taking existing theoretical explanations
of the psychological processing of art, and placing these into a
unified visual basis for the purpose of articulating how, and if,
they address specific outcomes from our art experience. These
outcomes were also tied to inputs or contextual factors, and
general processing stages. Through this review, we hoped to both
provide a new tool for discussing the modeling of art, displaying
how models may differ or overlap, and providing a more general
window into the present state of art psychology research. We
conclude with a short discussion of these models’ synthesis, and
suggestions or implications for future research.
13He was specifically referring to literary experiences, however this would
presumably also apply to visual art.
The State of Art Modeling: Some
Agreement on Outputs; Many Paths for
How They Are Achieved; Many Avenues for
Empirical Investigation
First, concerning outputs or psychological implications, as
noted in the introduction, these factors might be said to drive
art’s psychological interest, and are thus the prime targets for
modeling itself. This was also a main contribution of our paper,
which sought to identify a range of potential outputs and label
these when they were considered in the specific models. For
the purpose of quick comparison, all outputs are summarized
in Table 1, which denotes whether or not they are explicitly or
implicitly included in each of the reviewed models, or omitted.
This table also provides a similar review for inputs. For more
extensive comparison, we have also provided a brief synopsis of
each model’s specific explanations for outputs in Table 2 (Parts 1
and 2).
Looking at this comparison, it is interesting to note that
all models share some common factors. Notably, almost all
authors consider emotion and evaluations as main outputs,
and also make an explicit connection to meaning making.
This itself may tell us something about current modeling, and
the present state of understanding and focus in art research.
While this review obviously could not consider all approaches
important to art, it does suggest that these common outputs
may constitute what investigators feel to be important for
defining art interaction. These outputs also mark major factors
in present empirical assessment. This probably stems from the
present information processing focus. Most models also consider
several basic inputs, which might be roughly divided into social,
contextual, experiential, and personality-derived elements.
At the same time, the models also differ greatly in
their explanations for how one arrives at these outputs, and
connects these elements to different processing components.
For example in the case of appraisal, as Table 2 Part 1
shows, descriptions range from: an emphasis on visual object
identification (Chatterjee), integration of vision with memory
(Locher), emphasis on intellectual processing experience and
understanding of art (Leder), relative matching of schema and
self (Silvia, Pelowski), to taking a pragmatic vs. aesthetic mode
(Cupchik). This diversity highlights the presently undetermined
nature of current art psychological approaches, and the need for
more comprehensive and comparative analyses.
Importantly, this also highlights the potential contribution
of this paper, and of visual modeling. As noted above, one of
the benefits of a visual model approach is that it forces an
author to make an explicit connection between processes and
outputs, articulating connections where they might be otherwise
obscured in written theory. By placing these same outputs in the
visualmodels, tracing back through their processing descriptions,
and comparing between approaches, we may create grounds for
future empirical research. We have set up this paper to facilitate
this approach. We suggest that the reader might use this review
as a means of considering the pathways to the various outputs,
and thus the underlying factors and processing sequences. These
could then be considered in empirical approaches. This review
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TABLE 1 | Overview of explicitly mentioned inputs and outputs in models of art experience.
Chatterjee Locher et al. Leder et al. Silvia et al. Pelowski Cupchik
INPUTS
Personality – › – › › ›
Prior affective state – › › – – ›
Memory, knowledge › › › › › ›
Art display, context – › › • › –
Artwork qualities › › • • – ›
Social/cultural setting – › › • › –
OUTPUTS
Basic affect/body
Affect › • › › › ›
Physiology • – – › › –
Action • › – • › –
Info. processing
Appraisal › › › › › ›
Meaning › › › › › ›
Novelty • • • • › •
Art-specific reactions
Transcendence – – • – › •
Aesthetic/detached • – › – › ›
Negative • – – › › ›
Longitudinal impact
Self Adjustment • – • › › ›
Social › – • – › –
Health – – • – – •
Circle (›) signifies explicit mention and discussion of Input/Output factor by author(s). Dot (•) signifies implicit mention. Dash (–) signifies no mention.
may also contribute to a better understanding of the theories of
these individual researchers.
It should also be noted that this review does not imply that
one model is “better” in describing outcomes than others. Rather
these models are all presumably describing different aspects of
the art processing sequence. This also shows in the models’
relative emphasis on different general stages (early, intermediate,
and late), which lead to different answers regarding outputs.
Future studies might use these different models to consider the
differential contribution of the posited sequences for determining
their relative impact on output factors.
Missing Elements: Physiology, Health,
Negative and Profound Reactions to Art
This comparison also highlights factors that appear to be largely
missing in present modeling, and by extension psychological
art research. When placed side-by-side, it becomes clear that
present approaches largely avoid several outputs. Notably, there
is a dearth of discussion of negative factors as well as of novelty,
change, or transformation. Beyond the immediate processing
components, there are other, long-term outputs that appear
under-represented—notably art’s role in general well-being or
health. As noted by Stevenson-Taylor and Mansell (2012, p.
105), “seldom is a rigorous exploration given to ascertaining
the effects of psychological change in the long-term. When
and how these changes occur is rarely addressed.” This does
certainly seem to be the case here. Longitudinal aspects were
not directly mentioned by any author. Similarly, social aspects
and socio-cultural adjustments also appear under-represented,
with the latter only directly mentioned by Silvia. Similarly
under-explored are insight, changed perception, and—somewhat
surprisingly—harmonious or aesthetic experience. While several
authors theoretically note how this might occur (for example
Leder argues that it would involve an act of cognitive mastery
approaching perfectly fluent matching of schema to work), it
occurs nowhere as a specific model output. This raises the
question of how these outcomes might actually have a lasting
impact. Only Pelowski and Akiba (2011) specifically note how
this might occur.
This general omission of factors as well is quite illuminating,
and can be traced into present empirical study, as well as
needed targets for future research. It has been recently noted
that especially the above negative or transformative factors are
often overlooked (Silvia and Brown, 2007; Leder, 2013; Pelowski,
2015), and remain prime candidates for future empirical
approaches. As well, there have been calls for assessments of art’s
health or positive benefits on the viewer (e.g., Cuypers et al.,
2012). By extrapolating from these missing outputs, we might
say that present models and theoretical discussion appear to be
missing a large number of consequences that might define the
importance of art for society or individuals, and thus why art
should, for example, be supported by public resources. Models
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TABLE 2 | Models of art experience and noted Outputs.
PART 1
Model Basic affect/body Information processing perception
Affect Physiology Action Appraisal Meaning Novelty
































Result of processing of
objects, extraction of
prototypes, connection











(?) Outcome of visual
processing and integration



















(?) Possible outcome of
augmented information




























properties from matching of


































(?) Presumably tied to
mismatches between











three main outcomes: little
emotion, negative emotion














Need to leave, fidget,






































Result of: (1) analytical/
schema-based processing















mode. Based on later
integration of context,
viewer and work.
(?) Potentially result of:








Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 17 April 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 160
Pelowski et al. Visualizing Impact of Art
TABLE 2 | Continued
PART 2
Art-specific/highly notable reactions Longitudinal/contextual impact
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Output descriptions based on authors’ published models and related publications. Factors preceded by a question mark (?) were not specifically mentioned by the authors, but were
proposed by the present paper.
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also appear to omit what might be called “second order outputs”
or executive behavior consequences of viewing, such as when
anger leads to iconoclasm, vandalism, or violence (c.f. Freedberg,
1989). It is also interesting to note that most of the models do
not account for the viewer’s body, movement, or physiological
responses, which might also be considered (Tschacher et al.,
2012). These aspects, we would argue, remain key targets for
future modeling, which may then allow for better empirical
assessments. Interestingly, as we have tried to show in the
suggested additions and updated model figures, many outputs
might actually be connected to present model approaches, raising
again an avenue for future research and what we hope can be a
contribution of this paper.
Regarding inputs, there are also areas for future development.
Specific artwork-related aspects such as style are not included in
several models (Chatterjee, Silvia, Pelowski). The same can be
said for the artwork’s historical context, which was also recently
argued to be a key processing input (Bullot and Reber, 2013),
but in the present review only operationalized as one aspect
of the background knowledge of viewers (e.g., by Locher and
Leder, but see Pelowski and Akiba, 2011). It also appears that
only the models put forward by Leder and Cupchik account for
the current psychophysiological and affective state of the viewer.
These aspects should be incorporated into the other models and
systematically includedwhen setting up experiments. In addition,
while most authors specifically note the importance of memory
components for processing, and often mention this in their
written theory, it is often omitted in the models. This begs for
integration and elaboration.
The models’ differing discussion of factors, and many of
their omissions, are also probably a result of present emphasis
on early and intermediate processing stages, and tied to the
importance of vision and early neurological components of
object recognition. This too suggests a potential fruitful target
for future theoretical research. Those models that do focus on
late processing (Pelowski, Silvia) are more likely to consider
the omitted outputs. This again does not imply that certain
models are more or less important: the models that focus on
earlier processes may, for example, involve a more detailed
consideration of the bottom-up processing of artwork qualities,
whereas models with a later focus may concern primarily
top-down contributions of the viewer. This speaks to a need
for combining these discussions into one processing sequence.
Future researchers might consider how the visual processes (e.g.,
as described by Locher and Chatterjee) feed into the cognitive
processes described by Leder, and then lead to the top-down
consequences described by the remaining authors. It may also
be fruitful to look at the described processing sequences for
each output and consider a best solution, given these, and other
model’s descriptions. While such a synthesis is beyond the aim of
the present manuscript, we argue that this is a necessary next step
for future research.
Box and Arrow Models: Limitations and
Future Developments
Finally, a few words should also be given regarding the nature
of above models themselves. As noted, they are all box and
arrow designs. This represents an important fact in cognitive
psychology and discussion of art, because they specifically require
theoretical links between inputs, outputs, and processes. At the
same time, this method has several general limitations, which
future researchers might consider.
It should be clear from this review that while the simple act
of connecting inputs to processes to outputs is an important
theoretical step for a better understanding of psychological
events, the simple arrows that make up many aspects of
the above models often do not sufficiently explain how this
might actually be accomplished. Many models, especially when
visualized, also reveal gaps or confusions in their design.
More detail and consideration of individual and contextual
factors is often warranted. Many approaches might benefit
from more careful consideration of both specific decisions or
factors, which can determine specific model sequences, and
placement of outputs. While we did attempt to take the step
of systematizing the broad components of each approach, we
also made the decision to maintain fidelity to the original model
interior organization, which in many cases only highlights such
suboptimal arrangements. From this review, we would be the first
to argue that the field of modeling in aesthetics itself could benefit
from more attention to such aspects of visual communication.
We hope that future research might consider this.
The linear nature of these models can also lead to a
myopic, “false” and often one-dimensional understanding of
psychological processes themselves. In reality, these might often
occur in concert as complex networks of activation (Cela-Conde
et al., 2013), or with individuals cycling back and forth between
stages, constantly adjusting and updating expectations, which
influences perception and experience. While these aspects were
at least addressed in some of the reviewed models (e.g., Pelowski,
Silvia, and the discussion by Leder), such complex approaches,
require further emphasis, and become even more necessary
when taking the next step of connecting sequences to activity in
the brain. Further, it may be that future research should even
move past the box and arrow design, considering for example
novel paradigms such as Bayesian flow models, or predictive
processing theory (Clark, 2013, 2015) which posits that the brain
operates based on comparisons with automatic predictions of the
environment; both result in more complex probabilistic models
of outputs or experience.
To conclude, we hope that this review may contribute to such
future modeling, and serve as a useful basis for needed future
comparative and hypothesis-driven research.
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